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Our ability to successfully comprehend language and interact with the world often relies 
on the ability to maintain both short- and long-term representations of objects. For 
example, if you were tasked with retrieving a tomato from a friend’s kitchen, you would 
initially be in search of a red fruit. When you discover that they only have green tomatoes 
in their kitchen, you are able to maintain this short-term, episodic information about this 
particular set of tomatoes, while still knowing that tomatoes are red in general. In this 
study I seek to examine how these memory systems interact during language processing. 
The review will first focus on findings from the event cognition and sentence processing 
literature which provide insight into how one updates representations on-line. The focus 
will then turn to studies of semantic representation that are pivotal in understanding the 
color priming effects that will be central in this study. 
On-line representation of object-states 
While there has been a large amount of research conducted on the comprehension of 
events in language (see Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998 for a review), there has been 
comparatively little work examining the on-line representations that are constructed and 
manipulated during language comprehension. Altmann and Kamide (2009) conducted an 
experiment exploring these changes in on-line representation with a specific focus on 
location updating. They show that when sentences describe movement of an object in a 
static visual scene to another location in the scene, subsequent mentions of this object 
drive looks to where the object was described to have moved to, rather than where it was 
in the display. Their results not only show that the state of mental object representation 
during events is continually updated as language unfolds, but they also suggest that the 
various states of an object (e.g. current and previous) might be simultaneously active 
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during language comprehension (see also Kukona, Altmann, & Kamide, 2014, for further 
discussion). Hindy, Altmann, Kalenik, and Thompson-Schill (2012) and Solomon, Hindy, 
Altmann, and Thompson-Schill (2015) tested this prediction by examining differential 
brain responses to processing language that described objects undergoing various changes 
from their canonical state: they suggested that in discourse such as “The man will chop 
the tomato, and then he will smell the tomato,” reference to the sentence final “tomato” 
requires a need to select a particular state of the tomato (the intact state of the tomato 
before the chopping, or the cut up state of the tomato after the chopping). When referring 
to an object that had previously been, for example, weighed, the states of the object are 
roughly identical, so no competition is observed when referring to it. The results of these 
studies showed that brain regions involved in resolving competition become more active 
when language refers to objects that had previously undergone substantial change 
(“chop”), compared to minimal (“weigh”). And because more than one representation 
must be active for competition to obtain, these results entail simultaneously active 
representations of object state. Moreover, these competition effects seem to be token 
specific. That is, sentences such as “The man will chop the tomato, and then he will smell 
another tomato,” do not activate neural regions associated with competition any more 
than sentences that refer to a tomato that had previously been weighed. 
 Taken together, these lines of research show that mental representations of events 
described by language are updated during processing and that tracking of the states of 
object tokens seems to be critically important. A more formalized account of these 
phenomena is described in Altmann (2017). The specifics of the account are omitted for 
the purposes here, but this account makes one critical prediction: object-state tokens are a 
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fundamental representational unit of event representation generally and these tokens carry 
with them information about prior states of the token. 
Object and color representation 
Although the findings described provide insight into what sort of unit is being tracked as 
one processes language, it says little about what makes up this unit, i.e. what are the 
content of these object tokens? Embodied theories of conceptual representation, such as 
the perceptual symbol systems account of Barsalou (1999), suggest that the long-term 
representation of any concept contains features that were active during past perceptions 
of, and interactions with, the object. For example, the semantic representation of “tomato” 
would contain color information that was perceived through repeated exposure to 
tomatoes in the world. Therefore the representation of the “tomato” concept would carry 
with it its color associations, i.e. they are normally red but can plausibly be green, a 
notion empirically supported through the experiments discussed below (see also Yee, 
Ahmed, & Thompson-Schill, 2012). 
 Research using the visual-world paradigm has been used to examine the 
relationship of these sorts of sensorimotor representations between multiple concepts. 
Huettig and Altmann (2011) used the paradigm to probe whether the activation of 
semantic information associated with a concept could drive looks to related objects in a 
visual scene. Here, critical words were presented in a sentence context (“The boy thought 
about it carefully and then he spotted the pea and asked whether it was a vegetable too.”) 
while participants viewed a quadrant display with three unrelated distractor objects and 
one target object that shared the same surface color as a canonical pea (a green jacket). 
They show that after the onset of “pea” more saccades were directed to the similarly 
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colored jacket than any of the distractors. This indicates that eye movements are driven 
by the semantic similarity (color in this case) between the auditory and visual input, and 
provides validation of the paradigm that will be used in the experiments below. 
 Given the present study’s emphasis on episodic and semantic interplay regarding 
color associations in unfolding language (i.e. on learning that the tomatoes you are 
searching for are not red but are green), it becomes important then to have available 
alternatives to prototypical color associations. This raises the issue of how atypical color 
features become active during processing. Connell and Lynott (2009) examined the 
degree to which atypical contexts are able to modulate the activation of typical and 
atypical colors through language comprehension. Here they presented participants with 
words with strong color associations in sentence contexts which would prompt one to 
either imagine the object that the word refers to in a typical or atypical color. For 
example, “Joe was excited to see a bear in the woods” would prompt one to think of a 
brown bear, while “Joe was excited to see a bear at the North Pole” would prompt one to 
think of a white polar bear instead. Using a semantic Stroop task, they examined the 
degree to which sentences such as these would facilitate successful recognition of the 
word “bear” presented in a font in the object’s typical or atypical color, e.g. in brown or 
white lettering for the bear example above. Their results showed that when the implied 
color of the object is typical, priming in the Stroop task was observed for only the typical 
color font. However, they observed that when the implied color of the object was atypical, 
there was priming for both the typical and atypical font colors. This suggests that when 
contexts prompt instantiation of a typical example of an object, only its canonical features 
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become activated, but when context prompts instantiation of an atypical example of an 
object, features of both that atypical object and canonical features become active. 
The present study 
The present study uses the visual world paradigm to probe the relative activation of 
episodic and semantic memory activation through the course of sentence comprehension. 
Specifically, it addresses the representational content of newly instantiated object tokens 
in unfolding language. To this end, two experiments were conducted. The first uses 
sentence triples that introduce an object with strong color associations in the first 
sentence, attribute plausible but atypical colors to these objects in the second sentence, 
and then in the final sentence refer back either to these atypically colored objects (same-
token reference) or to new tokens of an object of the same type (different-token 
reference). For example, “The man has some tomatoes. They are green. He will take out 
a scale and weigh some of the tomatoes” (same-token) vs. “The man has some tomatoes. 
They are green. He will take out a scale and weigh some other tomatoes” (different-
token). The visual scenes in this experiment critically contain an object that shares the 
same surface color as the typical color of the object mentioned in the sentence (red for 
“tomato”). The number of looks towards the critical object in the display is taken to 
indicate activation of the typical color representation from semantic memory. 
 The previously described findings suggest the following predictions: For the 
same-token condition, the language explicitly refers to atypically colored objects as the 
referent. Given this, one straightforward prediction can be made such that upon 
encountering the noun in the final sentence (“He will… weigh some of the tomatoes”), 
one should observe no difference in looks between the target object (a red object, for the 
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tomato example) and distractors – this is because the tomato in question is green, not red, 
and should therefore engender no more looks to a red object than to any other (unrelated) 
object. However, given the account of Altmann (2017) and the findings of Connell and 
Lynott (2009), one could also predict that there will be more looks to the target object 
compared to distractors. The account of Altmann and the account Connell and Lynott 
predict this pattern for different reasons. The sentences used here are intended to prompt 
instantiation of a typical object, which is then discovered to be atypically colored. This 
implies a transformation of the mental representation from typical to atypical, even 
though these objects are, in fact, different tokens of the same object. For Altmann, this 
means that the previous typical qualities of the object are carried with it, even though it is 
atypically colored. That is, by virtue of the atypically colored object being previously 
thought of as typically colored, canonical color will be activated when the object is 
referred to. Connell and Lynott, however, suggest that the activation of the atypical state 
of an object brings with it characteristics of the typical object generally (that is, a 
property of atypically featured objects is that they activate their typical features also, 
regardless of any past history or context; the Altmann account can be construed as 
positing that the typical features are activated only if they had previously been activated). 
A further comparison of these accounts will be discussed later. 
 For the different-token case, two potential patterns could emerge. If there is an 
increase in looks to the target object, this suggests that the instantiation of a new object 
token entails typical characteristics, which would be predicted by Connell and Lynott 
(2009). If it’s the case that there is no difference in looks, this might be indicative of an 
influence from previous salient episodic information being inherited into new object 
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tokens. In other words, residual activation from the previous feature set influences the 
subsequently activated feature set. 
 A second experiment will be described below, which provides a baseline measure 
against which to contrast the data from Experiment 1. 
Experiment 1 
Methods 
Participants  
Thirty-two participants were recruited from the University of Connecticut Introduction to 
Psychology subject pool1. All participants were native speakers of English, aged 18 or 
above, and had normal or corrected to normal hearing and vision.  
Sentence contexts and visual displays 
Two experimental conditions were used for the present study: same-token sentences and 
different-token sentences.  
 
Same-token reference: “The man has some tomatoes. They are green. He will take out a 
scale and weigh some of the tomatoes.” 
Different-token reference: “The man has some tomatoes. They are green. He will take out 
a scale and weigh some other tomatoes.” 
 
A total of 120 trials took place during the experiment with the experimental items, filler 
items, and comprehension questions interleaved in a fixed (across participants) random 
order. Thirty-four experimental sentences were presented, counter-balanced across 
                                                      
1 An additional 10 participants had been run, but were excluded prior to analysis because 
of computer malfunction which was subsequently corrected or inconsistent calibration. 
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participants. Sixty-six filler sentences of 3 types were also presented. None of the objects 
in these sentences necessarily had strong color associations. The first type omitted the 
second sentence, e.g. “The man has some bread. He will throw away the wrapper and 
open some other bread.” The second type used a non-color adjective in the second 
sentence, e.g. “The man has some slippers. They are ragged. He will sit in his chair and 
put on some other slippers.” The third type used the same structure as the experimental 
items, though the nouns were singular, e.g. “The child has a sleeping bag. It is blue. He 
will extinguish the campfire and sleep in the sleeping bag.” Twenty comprehension 
questions were used during the experiment in order to promote attentive listening. These 
questions probed for information about the actions and objects mentioned in the sentence, 
e.g. “Did the man weigh the green tomatoes?”  
 For each trial a quadrant display was presented to participants. For experimental 
trials, this display contained one target object (that shared the surface color of the object 
mentioned in the sentence-final position) and three distractor objects that were not related 
in any way. For filler trials, no objects in the display were related to the sentential context. 
The object referred to by the sentence-final noun never appeared in the display. The 
objects displayed in the visual display were photographic images of various items. See 
Figure 1 for a sample display. 
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Figure 1. Experimental display corresponding to the sentence contexts “The man has some 
tomatoes. They are green. He will take out a scale and weigh some of the/some other tomatoes.” 
Object color and reference norming  
Each of the 34 experimental sentences referenced objects with strong color associations. 
It was important that all mentioned objects had strong primary color associations and 
secondary plausible colors, i.e. that tomatoes are primarily red and plausibly green for the 
sentence “The man has some tomatoes. They are green. He will take out a scale and 
weigh some of the/some other tomatoes.” In order to ensure that this is the case, the 
stimuli were normed by 99 native English speakers from the US (recruited using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk) who gave judgments using Qualtrics presentation software about color 
likelihood of objects using a fill-in-the-blank form. Participants were asked to provide the 
most likely, the second through fourth most likely, and the least likely color of 61 
different objects. Thirty-four objects were chosen for the experiment from this initial set 
of 61. For each of these 34 at least 75% of participants agreed that a particular color was 
the most likely color of an object, and at least 35% of participants agreed that a particular 
color was the second most likely color of an object. The nature of the items used here 
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prohibited a more strict secondary color requirement as many items did not have a 
diagnostic color (e.g. golf balls are normally white, but the secondary color was less 
agreed upon). Some items did in fact have strong secondary color associations though, 
e.g. tomatoes are normally red and secondarily green. The paradigm used here only 
required that the secondary color be plausible, which I take this 35% to be indicative of. 
 A second norming study was carried out to establish whether, for the example 
above, participants would assume that weighing “some of the tomatoes” meant weighing 
green tomatoes, and whether weighing “some other tomatoes” would mean weighing red 
tomatoes (the canonical color). Seventy-seven native speakers of English from the US 
(recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk) provided judgments. Each participant was 
shown a quadrant visual display with 2 critical items, 2 unrelated distractor items, and the 
experimental sentence. Each of these objects were cropped images of real objects. The 
critical items in the display were the critical objects in their primary and secondary colors. 
For example, a display would be shown with green tomatoes, red tomatoes, two unrelated 
distractor objects, and the sentence “The man has some tomatoes. They are green. He will 
take out a scale and weigh some of the tomatoes.” Participants were instructed to choose 
the object that was being referred at the end of the final sentence. Lists were 
counterbalanced such that each participant was only presented with one of the two 
experimental sentence contexts for each item. For all experimental sentences, at least 
75% of participants selected that “some of the tomatoes” referred to an object in its 
secondary color (green, in this case), and “some other tomatoes” referred to the object in 
its primary color (red, in this case). 
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Procedure 
Participants were seated approximately 60 cm from a 24-inch monitor. Eye-movements 
were recorded using an SR Research Eyelink 1000 Plus eye tracker with remote camera 
(500 Hz sampling rate). Participant head movements were unrestricted. Participants were 
told that they should listen to each sentence carefully and that there would be occasional 
comprehension questions. Eight sets of 5-point calibration were conducted throughout the 
course of the experiment. 
Each trial began after participants fixated a central point on the display. A blank 
screen was shown as participants were auditorily presented with the first two sentences. 
At the offset of the second sentence, the blank screen was replaced with the 
corresponding quadrant display for that experimental item. There was then a 2000 ms 
delay between the offset of the second sentence and the onset of the third sentence. After 
the offset of the final sentence, the display remained on the screen for 2000 ms. 
The location of the target object was randomized across trials, but was fixed 
across participants. Each participant heard only one variation of each sentence context, 
and the trial structure was counter-balanced such that the sentence context for each object 
was presented to an equal number of participants. 
Results 
Interest areas for each visual scene were similarly sized rectangular shapes around each 
of the four objects in the display. Given the predictions described above, the results 
presented here focus on the final verb phrase in the third sentence. They will be described 
with reference to the experimental item “The man has some tomatoes. They are green. He 
will take out a scale and weigh some of the/some other tomatoes”. The primary measures 
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reported here are saccades to, and fixations on, an item in the display. The proportion of 
saccades is calculated as the proportion of trials in which a saccade was launched to an 
object in the visual display during the final determiner phrase, while the proportion of 
fixations is calculated as the proportion of trials in which there was a fixation on an 
object in the display during this time region. As there is only one critical object in each 
display (e.g. the red object) and all distractors are theoretically equivalent in this design, 
looks to distractors have been averaged. 2 (condition: same token, different token) x 2 
(object: target, distractor) ANOVAs were conducted for all saccadic and fixation 
measures. Given the nature of the proportion measures, arcsine transformations were 
used for all statistical analyses. Descriptive statistics of untransformed data for each 
segment of the critical region are shown in Tables 1 through 3. Figure 2 shows the 
untransformed proportion of fixations across for the critical region. 
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Table 1. Proportion of fixations to target and distractor objects at word onsets and offsets 
(standard deviation in parentheses). 
 
 
Table 2. Proportion of saccades to target and distractor objects from the onset of the listed word 
to the onset of the next listed word (excluding “tomatoes” which was measured from word onset 
to word offset; standard deviation in parentheses). 
 
 
Table 3. Proportion of saccades to target and distractor objects from the onset of “some” to the 
offset of “tomatoes.” 
 
 
 
Weigh Some)of)the/Some)other Tomatoes
Onset Offset Onset Offset Onset Offset
Subjects Same7Token Target 22.44)(11.16) 18.08)(8.42) 16.84)(8.76) 19.60)(11.35) 19.77)(11.37) 22.22)(9.70)
Distractors 19.98)(5.04) 21.38)(5.46) 21.81)(5.58) 21.02)(5.55) 21.08)(5.50) 19.55)(4.97)
Different7Token Target 16.36)(10.32) 16.73)(12.78) 16.36)(13.43) 18.20)(11.99) 18.57)(12.15) 22.24)(10.54)
Distractors 21.20)(5.99) 21.02)(5.37) 21.02)(5.51) 20.96)(5.23) 20.96)(5.23) 19.85)(5.74)
Items Same7Token Target 11.40)(4.47) 9.19)(4.13) 8.55)(3.89) 9.93)(5.21) 10.02)(5.24) 11.31)(5.51)
Distractors 9.99)(2.10) 10.69)(1.97) 10.91)(1.75) 10.51)(1.74) 10.54)(1.77) 9.77)(1.63)
Different7Token Target 8.18)(5.39) 8.36)(5.12) 8.18)(4.98) 9.10)(6.50) 9.28)(6.52) 11.12)(6.20)
Distractors 10.60)(1.82) 10.51)(1.80) 10.51)(1.76) 10.48)(2.29) 10.48)(2.29) 9.93)(2.58)
Weigh Some)of)the/Some)other Tomatoes
Subjects Same5Token Target 8.64)(6.84) 13.79)(9.64) 15.63)(9.75)
Distractors 12.25)(6.28) 11.40)(6.23) 12.75)(5.79)
Different5Token Target 10.85)(8.98) 14.52)(10.56) 13.97)(8.29)
Distractors 11.27)(6.59) 12.81)(5.43) 11.58)(6.37)
Items Same5Token Target 4.32)(3.60) 6.89)(4.85) 7.81)(5.80)
Distractors 6.13)(2.73) 5.70)(2.06) 6.37)(2.07)
Different5Token Target 5.42)(5.76) 7.26)(4.41) 6.99)(5.81)
Distractors 5.64)(2.67) 6.40)(2.56) 5.79)(2.80)
Onset&of&"Some"&to&offset&of&"Tomatoes"
Subjects Same2Token Target 28.31&(12.89)
Distractors 23.28&(10.14)
Different2Token Target 27.02&(10.66)
Distractors 23.47&(9.78)
Items Same2Token Target 14.15&(5.04)
Distractors 11.53&(2.47)
Different2Token Target 13.51&(6.28)
Distractors 11.73&(3.20)
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Examining saccades during the region beginning at the onset of “some” to the 
offset of “tomato,” a marginally significant main effect of object was observed (by-
subjects: F(1,31) = 5.884, p = .021; by-items: F(1,33) = 1.924, p = .175), with more 
saccades being launched to the target object than distractor objects. There was no main 
effect of condition (by-subjects: F(1,31) = 0.189, p = .667; by-items: F(1,33) = .321, p 
= .575) and there was no interaction of object and condition (by-subjects: F(1,31) = .219, 
p = .643; by-items: F(1,33) = .396, p = .533). 
In order to ensure that this (marginal) difference in saccades was a result of the 
language presented during the region described above, fixations at the onset of “some” 
were also examined (reflecting the eye movement record before the critical difference 
between the sentence conditions). This analysis shows a main effect of object (by-
subjects: F(1,31) = 12.161, p = .001; by-items: F(1,33) = 9.406, p = .004), with more 
fixations being observed on the distractor objects compared to the target object. No main 
effect of condition (by-subjects: F(1,31) = 1.416, p = .243; by-items: F(1,33) = 1.022, p 
= .319) or interaction (by-subjects: F(1,31) = .133, p = .718; by-items: F(1,33) = .250, p 
= .875) was observed. 
Despite more saccades being directed towards the target object compared to 
distractors from the onset of “some” to the offset of “tomato”, analysis of fixations at the 
offset of “tomato” revealed no difference in fixation probability as a function of object 
(by-subjects: F(1,31) = 1.391, p = .247; by-items: F(1,33) = .060, p = .808) although the 
same pattern is numerically shown. No main effect of condition (by-subjects: F(1,31) 
= .003, p = .950; by-items: F(1,33) = .005, p = .943) and no interaction between object 
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and condition (by-subjects: F(1,31) = .003, p = .960; by-items: F(1,33) = .015, p = .903) 
were shown. No other differences in sub-regions or intervening points were significant. 
Discussion 
This experiment examined the degree to which previous episodic information influenced 
the representation of subsequent objects that are referred to in language. Here 
experimental sentences attributed atypical (but plausible) color information to objects 
with strong canonical color representations (e.g. attributing a green color to a canonically 
red tomato). These sentences subsequently either referred to objects with this atypical 
color (same token) or referred to a new set of tokens (different token). The results show 
that beginning from the onset of the determiner phrase to the offset of the noun (“some of 
the/some other tomatoes”), more saccades were launched to an object in the display that 
shared surface color with the canonical color of the object mentioned compared to 
unrelated distractor objects (although this difference was only significant in a by-subjects 
analysis) despite a statistically significant bias favoring looks to distractor objects at the 
onset of the region. No differences were observed in comparing the number of saccades 
to the target object between the same-token and different-token conditions.  
For the same-token case, this pattern (if statistically reliable) would suggest that 
regardless of the fact that the language is explicitly referring to a set of atypically colored 
objects, the canonical color becomes active during reference. This pattern of results is 
predicted based on the accounts of both Altmann (2017) and Connell & Lynott (2009). 
These accounts differ in their theoretical motivation for making this prediction however.  
For Altmann, objects that undergo change carry with them aspects of their 
histories. To illustrate this, consider the experimental stimulus: “The man has some 
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tomatoes. They are green. He will take out a scale and weigh some of the tomatoes.” This 
discourse first prompts instantiation of a set of canonical, red tomatoes, which are then 
modified in the second sentence when they are attributed a new color (green). When the 
final sentence refers back to these objects, by virtue of the objects having previously been 
attributed the red feature, this discourse final reference will result in activation of both 
red and green color features. 
According to Connell and Lynott (2009), sentential contexts that prompt 
instantiation of objects in non-canonical forms also result in the activation of the 
canonical features as well. Given our experimental stimuli, when sentences prompt the 
instantiation of atypical objects (e.g. referring to a set of green tomatoes), by-virtue of 
tomatoes having a canonical color, both red and green color features are activated. 
Although the current experiment is not able to tease apart these accounts, this account 
does not seem to be compatible with the findings of Hindy et al. (2012). As previously 
mentioned, they compared the processing of sentences which described substantially, 
compared to minimally, changed objects. In addition to showing “competition” effects 
when referring back to the changed object in sentences such as “The man will chop the 
tomato, and then he will smell the tomato,” they also observed competition in sentences 
such as “The man will chop the tomato, but first he will smell the tomato.” Here the 
sentence context prompts the instantiation of a tomato representation from before the 
chopping event, which, according to the account of Connell and Lynott, should only 
activate the canonical representation. If that’s the case, no competition effects should 
have been observed, but they were. Given this, the account of Altmann seems to have the 
most explanatory power regarding the results of Hindy et al. (though the account of 
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Connell and Lynott did not explicitly intend to account for these effects). Regarding the 
different-token condition, the same pattern was found with more saccades being directed 
to the target object in the display compared to distractors. This is suggestive that the 
instantiation of new objects prompts activation of typical features. 
However, an unresolved issue in the interpretation of these results (to the extent 
that we observed a marginally significant effect of object) is that there is no baseline by 
which we can judge the effects. It could be the case that the attribution of atypical color 
in this paradigm was ineffective and objects maintain their typical color as a result of this. 
To this end, a second experiment was conducted where instead of introducing the 
tomatoes and then changing their color to the atypical green, the tomatoes were 
introduced but no reference to their color was given, allowing them to maintain their 
“generic redness”. This provides the ability to establish a baseline and judge the 
sensitivity of the paradigm. 
Experiment 2 
Methods 
Participants  
Twenty-two participants were recruited from the University of Connecticut Introduction 
to Psychology subject pool2. No participants who took part in Experiment 1 took part in 
this experiment. All participants were native speakers of English, aged 18 or above, and 
had normal or corrected to normal hearing and vision.  
 
 
                                                      
2 An additional 7 participants had been run, but were excluded prior to analysis because 
of incomplete data or inconsistent calibration. 
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Sentence contexts and visual displays 
The same set of experimental stimuli from Experiment 1 was used here, although the 
second sentence was omitted: 
 
Same-token reference: “The man has some tomatoes. He will take out a scale and weigh 
some of the tomatoes.” 
Difference-token reference: “The man has some tomatoes. He will take out a scale and 
weigh some other tomatoes. 
 
The filler items and visual scenes were unchanged from Experiment 1, and the same 
counter-balancing scheme was used here. 
Procedure  
The procedure was unchanged from Experiment 1. 
Results  
Interest areas for this experiment were the same as Experiment 1. 2 (condition: same 
token, different token) x 2 (object: target distractor) ANOVAs were conducted for all 
saccadic and fixation measures. Arcsine transformations were used for all inferential 
statistics described below. Descriptive statistics of untransformed data are reported in 
Tables 4 through 6 and Figure 3 shows the untransformed proportion of fixations across 
the entire critical sentence region. Again, for simplicity in description the results will be 
described with reference to the example phrase “The man will weigh some of the/some 
other tomatoes.” 
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Table 4. Proportion of fixations to target and distractor objects at word onsets and offsets 
(standard deviation in parentheses). 
 
 
Table 5. Proportion of saccades to target and distractor objects from the onset of the listed word 
to the onset of the next listed word (excluding “tomatoes” which was measured from word onset 
to word offset; standard deviation in parentheses). 
 
 
Table 6. Proportion of saccades to target and distractor objects from the onset of “some” to the 
offset of “tomatoes.” 
 
 
 
Weigh Some)of)the/Some)other Tomatoes
Onset Offset Onset Offset Onset Offset
Subjects Same7Token Target 20.32)(11.73) 24.60)(12.66) 24.87)(13.70) 22.73)(15.75) 22.46)(15.58) 22.46)(13.04)
Distractors 20.23)(4.58) 18.27)(4.62) 18.45)(4.71) 18.45)(7.23) 18.72)(7.00) 19.61)(5.21)
Different7Token Target 21.12)(11.43) 16.84)(12.48) 16.58)(12.13) 18.72)(11.14) 18.72)(11.14) 19.52)(15.34)
Distractors 19.34)(6.69) 20.68)(7.02) 20.68)(7.28) 19.96)(7.02) 19.88)(6.93) 19.88)(7.09)
Items Same7Token Target 10.16)(5.39) 12.30)(6.76) 12.43)(6.74) 11.36)(6.55) 11.23)(6.15) 11.23)(7.19)
Distractors 10.12)(2.68) 9.14)(2.49) 9.22)(2.62) 9.22)(2.31) 9.36)(2.16) 9.80)(2.42)
Different7Token Target 10.56)(6.50) 8.42)(5.61) 8.29)(5.30) 9.36)(5.70) 9.36)(5.70) 9.76)(5.83)
Distractors 9.67)(2.87) 10.34)(2.70) 10.34)(2.68) 9.98)(2.69) 9.94)(2.69) 9.94)(2.67)
Weigh Some)of)the/Some)other Tomatoes
Subjects Same5Token Target 14.97)(9.90) 12.57)(11.94) 12.03)(7.37)
Distractors 12.21)(5.34) 12.75)(8.27) 12.30)(4.54)
Different5Token Target 9.89)(7.12) 13.64)(8.40) 13.64)(10.17)
Distractors 12.66)(8.04) 13.81)(5.97) 13.99)(6.88)
Items Same5Token Target 7.49)(6.89) 6.28)(4.88) 6.02)(5.68)
Distractors 6.11)(3.11) 6.37)(2.00) 6.15)(2.86)
Different5Token Target 4.95)(5.05) 6.82)(4.91) 6.82)(4.91)
Distractors 6.33)(3.53) 6.91)(2.59) 7.00)(3.34)
Onset&of&"Some"&to&offset&of&"Tomatoes"
Subjects Same2Token Target 24.33&(14.89)
Distractors 24.51&(10.90)
Different2Token Target 26.20&(14.94)
Distractors 27.09&(10.39)
Items Same2Token Target 12.17&(6.96)
Distractors 12.25&(3.15)
Different2Token Target 13.10&(7.65)
Distractors 13.55&(3.62)
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An examination of saccades from the onset of “some” to the offset of “tomato” 
shows no main effect of object (by-subjects: F(1,21) = .311, p = .583; by-items: F(1,33) 
= 1.396, p = .246), or condition (by-subjects: F(1,21) = 1.805, p = .583; by-items: F(1,33) 
= .475, p = .495), and no interaction between these variables (by-subjects: F(1,21) = .037, 
p = .850; by-items: F(1,33) = .294, p = .591). 
An analysis of fixations at the onset of “some” shows no main effect of object 
(by-subjects: F(1,21) = .048, p = .829; by-items: F(1,33) = .387, p = .538). However, a 
main effect of condition (by-subjects: F(1,21) = 5.838, p = .025; by-items: F(1,33) = 
4.222, p = .048) and an interaction between object and condition was observed (by-
subjects: F(1,21) = 5.448, p = .030; by-items: F(1,33) = 5.447, p = .026). Given that the 
conditions did not differ by this point in the sentence, and thus reflect an arbitrary 
grouping of data, no further t-tests were conducted. 
An analysis of fixations at the offset of “tomato” shows no main effect of object 
(by-subjects: F(1,21) = .013, p = .912; by-items: F(1,33) = .472, p = .497) or condition 
(by-subjects: F(1,21) = 3.054, p = .095; by-items: F(1,33) = .744, p = .395). No 
interaction between these variables was shown (by-subjects: F(1,21) = 1.463, p = .240; 
by-items: F(1,33) = .406, p = .528). 
Despite no main effects or interaction being shown in saccades from the onset of 
“some” to the offset of “tomato” an analysis from “tomato” onset to “tomato” offset 
shows a marginally significant main effect of object (by-subjects: F(1,21) = .575, p 
= .457; by-items: F(1,33) = 4.601, p = .039), with more saccades being directed towards 
distractor objects compared to the target object. No main effect of condition (by-subjects: 
F(1,21) = 1.099, p = .306; by-items: F(1,33) = 1.197, p = .282) or interaction between 
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object and condition (by-subjects: F(1,21) = .018, p = .895; by-items: F(1,33) = .042, p 
= .838) was observed. No other sub-region or intervening point showed significant 
differences. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, the activation of canonical color features during sentence processing in 
the absence of atypical color attribution was intended to provide a baseline with which to 
interpret the results of Experiment 1. However, the only significant effect of condition 
was at the onset of the determiner phrase. Given that by this point in the sentence both 
conditions are equivalent, this difference must be spurious. Aside from this, there were no 
significant differences in looks between target object and distractors (not as a function of 
condition). Further, an examination of saccades during the final noun show that more 
saccades were launched to distractor objects than the target object, the opposite pattern of 
what was expected. In fact, a qualitative examination of the data shows that the only 
point at which targets seem to be fixated more than distractor objects was long after the 
offset of the critical noun (as seen in Figure 3).  
It was predicted that referencing the discourse final noun would prompt activation 
of canonical features as in Huettig and Altmann (2011). The current results, while not 
contradictory, lend little support for this, however the paradigm used by Huettig and 
Altmann differs from the one used here in a few key ways. First is the issue of 
predictability of stimuli. With reference to “The man has some tomatoes. They are green. 
He will take out a scale and weigh some of the/some other tomatoes,” the stimuli used in 
this experiment enable one to anticipate the critical noun after “of the” and “other”; all 
stimuli referred back to the noun mentioned in the first sentence. Consider this sentence 
  24 
from the Huettig and Altmann stimuli: “The boy thought about it carefully and then he 
spotted the pea.” Given the type of structures used in their study, all activation associated 
with color must arise beginning from the mention of the critical noun and no anticipatory 
activation is possible. 
Second, and related to the point above, the sentences used in this study were 
predictable for the reason that all objects were repeated two times in each sentence 
context, while they were only presented once in Huettig and Altmann. It’s unclear to 
what extent this repetition influenced subsequent looks to the target object in the display. 
Third, in Huettig and Altmann, their paradigm involved a preview of the quadrant 
display before any language was presented. The procedure in this study involved the 
display being shown after some language was presented. This means that there could be 
pre-existing biases that influenced how the display was viewed even before the critical 
sentence region. 
These differences, along with fact that the color activation effects in Huettig and 
Altmann were late occurring, could be leading to a further attenuation of activation, 
resulting in the very late trend that is observed here. The previously mentioned 
experiment conducted by Connell and Lynott (2009), which showed color priming effects, 
was conducted by using a semantic Stroop task. The nature of this task means that 
activation of color features during sentence processing can be late occurring and still 
produce priming effects in the subsequent Stroop task. Further, Yee et al. (2012) show 
color priming effects in language processing only when participants took part in a Stroop 
task prior – that is, when they were already focused on color as a relevant feature. Based 
on these findings, although unexpected, there may be some explanation for why no 
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difference was observed here. However, the fact that we observed no difference in looks 
to the target object on hearing the sentence-final reference makes the interpretation of 
Experiment 1 problematic. Was the marginal effect observed there spurious? Given the 
previously mentioned research, one would not expect to find an effect in Experiment 1 
without also finding an effect in Experiment 2.  
General Discussion 
Two experiments explored the activation of semantic features of objects in sentential 
contexts. In Experiment 1, sentences prompted manipulation of the episodic features of 
these objects and then referred back to these changed objects or to different tokens of the 
same object type. In Experiment 2, sentence contexts involved instantiating objects in an 
episodic context (although their canonical properties were unchanged, unlike in 
Experiment 1), and these objects or different tokens of these objects, were again 
referenced at the end of the sentence.  
The results of Experiment 1 show that, in both conditions, marginally more 
saccades were launched to objects in a visual display that shared surface color with the 
canonical form of the object mentioned in the sentence (compared to unrelated distractor 
objects) from the onset of the determiner phrase preceding the noun to the offset of the 
noun (“He will weigh some of the/some other tomatoes”). In the discussion of 
Experiment 1, it was suggested that this supported the theoretical account of event 
processing from Altmann (2017), which makes the prediction that objects that are altered 
over time carry with them qualities of their previous states. It also suggests that the 
instantiation of new object tokens prompts activation of the canonical feature set 
associated with that object. 
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In Experiment 2, which was intended to provide a baseline for the interpretation 
of Experiment 1, no increase in looks to the object that shared surface color with the 
canonical color of the noun in the discourse, compared to distractor objects, was observed 
from the onset of the determiner to the offset of the noun as it was in Experiment 1. This 
may have arisen from the nature of our task, which attempted to manipulate and probe an 
already subtle activation effect. Given the results of Experiment 2, the interpretation of 
Experiment 1 is greatly complicated, because they suggest that the paradigm is not 
sensitive to color overlap in the way that was originally noted by Huettig & Altmann 
(2011).  
Generally, the results presented here are suggestive in that Experiment 1 supports 
(albeit weakly) the theoretical position that objects carry their histories with them. In 
order to more strongly support these claims, further work would need to be done, 
primarily in two areas. First, although previous evidence suggests that sentence contexts 
can produce color activation effects, the nature of these effects is somewhat small and 
late occurring. Further work would benefit the current account by using a similar 
paradigm but probing a more robust effect, such as shape priming (mentioning a “rubber 
band” in discourse prompting attention to an object with a similar form; Huettig & 
Altmann, 2004). For example, the sentence “John saw a rubber band on the ground. It 
was snapped. He will pick up the rubber band” could be used with a visual display in 
which there was a bracelet. Second, an accurate baseline would need to be attained. A 
fundamental quality of the stimuli used here is that they rely on referring to objects 
previously mentioned in the discourse, in contrast to other studies of conceptual priming 
mentioned here in which objects are only mentioned once. This leads to predictability of 
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upcoming language and a potential issue with repeated naming effects. In short, it’s 
unclear to what extent these issues influence the priming effects that we are intending to 
examine here, although this knowledge is crucial in interpreting the results of primary 
importance.  
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